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Abstract
Most analyses of the U.S. Great Moderation have been based on structural
VAR methods, and have consistently pointed towards good luck as the main
explanation for the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years. Based
on an estimated New-Keynesian model in which the only source of change is
t h em o v ef r o mp a s s i v et oa c t i v em o n e t a r yp o l i c y ,w es h o wt h a tV A R sm a y
misinterpret good policy for good luck.
First, the policy shift is su!cient to generate decreases in the theoretical
innovation variances for all series, and decreases in the variances of in ation
and the output gap, without any need of sunspot shocks. With sunspots, the
estimated model exhibits decreases in both variances and innovation variances
for all series. Second, policy counterfactuals based on the theoretical structural
VAR representations of the model under the two regimes fail to capture the
truth, whereas impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock exhibit
little change across regimes.
Since these results are in line with those found in the structural VAR-
based literature on the Great Moderation, our analysis suggests that existing
VAR evidence is compatible with the ‘good policy’ explanation of the Great
Moderation.
Keywords: Great Moderation; DSGE models; indeterminacy; vector autoregressions. 
 
JEL codes: E38, E52. 
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Non Technical Summary
Post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic history is usually divided into two distinct sub-
periods. The former period, which extends up to the end of the Volcker disin ation, is
characterised by a signicant extent of macroeconomic turbulence, with highly volatile
in ation and output growth. The latter period, from the end of the Volcker disin ation
up to the present day, is marked in contrast by signicantly smaller volatilities for both
in ation and output growth. These dramatic changes in the reduced-form properties
of the U.S. economy over the last several decades characterise a phenomenon known
as the ‘Great Moderation’.
A vast empirical literature has investigated the source(s) of the Great Moderation
in an attempt to disentangle the relative contributions of two main explanations:
good policy and good luck. Based on (time-varying or Markov-switching) structural
VAR methods, the good luck hypothesis has been advocated by a number of authors
including Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and
Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006). Based on estimated sticky-price DSGE models
of the U.S. economy, both Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2006) nd, in contrast, support for the good policy explanation originally advocated
by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), according to which a shift in the systematic
component of monetary policy has been the driving force behind the recent, greater
macroeconomic stability.
This paper tries to reconcile the two con icting sets of results by asking whether
methodological dierences between the two approaches might account for the dier-
ences in their outcomes. In order to investigate the ability of structural VAR methods
to correctly identify the sources of the Great Moderation, we use as data-generation
process a New Keynesian model in which–in line with Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–the only sources of change are the move
from passive to active monetary policy, and the presence of sunspots under indeter-
minacy. We estimate the model via Bayesian methods, and we explore the theoretical
properties of the estimated structure.
Our main results may be summarised as follows.
First, the shift in the systematic component of monetary policy associated with the
move from indeterminacy to determinacy is su!cient to generate, in population,( i)
decreases in the innovation variances for all series, and (ii) decreases in the variances
of in ation and the output gap, as a simple implication of the Lucas (1976) critique,
and without any need of sunspot shocks. With sunspot shocks, the estimated model
exhibits decreases in both variances and innovation variances in population when
moving from indeterminacy to determinacy, thus replicating the key features of the
Great Moderation.
Second, policy counterfactuals based on the theoretical structural VAR represen-
tations of the model under the two regimes fail to capture the truth. In particular,
substituting the VAR’s structural monetary rule corresponding to the indeterminacy6
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regime into the VAR for the determinacy regime causes a volatility decrease–rather
than an increase–for two series out of three.
Third, impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock exhibit little change
across regimes.
Overall, our results suggests that existing VAR evidence is, in principle, uninfor-
mative on the issue of the role played by monetary policy in the Great Moderation,
and is compatible with the notion that policy played a crucial role in fostering the
greater macroeconomic stability of recent years.
We identify two key dimensions along which VAR analysis turns out to be mis-
leading. First, in general, changes in the coe!cients of the monetary policy rule of the
DSGE model exert their impact on both the coe!cients of the VAR representation of
the model, and t h ee l e m e n t so ft h eV A R ’ sc o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo fr e d u c e d - f o r mi n n o -
vations. Although this is a well-known implication of the Lucas (1976) critique, this
point has generally been overlooked in the structural VAR-based empirical literature
on the Great Moderation, which has routinely interpreted changes in the volatilities
of the reduced-form innovations, accompanied by weak evidence of changes in the
VAR’s coe!cients, as evidence against good policy, and in favor of good luck. As this
paper shows, however, the dominant impact of a change in the systematic component
of monetary policy may well turn out to be the one on the elements of the VAR’s
covariance matrix, with a comparatively milder eect on the VAR’s coe!cients. As a
corollary, this logically implies that this kind of evidence does not allow, in principle,
to discriminate among the good policy and good luck explanations, simply because,
within our data generation process, they are essentially observationally equivalent.
Second, changes in the interest rate equation (i.e, the monetary policy rule) of
a structural VAR bear no clear-cut relationship with changes in the parameters of
the monetary policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. To put it dierently, there
appears to be a fundamental disconnect between what is structural within a DSGE
model, and what is dened as structural based on the structural VAR representation
implied by the very same DSGE model. Earlier contributions, on the other hand,
have performed counterfactual simulations in structural VARs under the implicit
presumption that switching the estimated coe!cients of the interest rate equations
in the structural VAR provides a reasonable approximation to the authentic policy
counterfactual, i.e. the one you obtain by switching the parameters of the monetary
policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. Again, as the present work shows, such
a presumption is, in general, unjustied.
Finally, the present work contribues to the literature along another dimension,
by identifying a crucial, and previously unnoticed dierence between the determi-
nacy and indeterminacy regimes for New Keynesian models. In particular, under
indeterminacy the equivalent minimal state-space representation of the DSGE model
possesses an additional state variable compared with the determinacy regime.7
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1 Introduction
Post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic history is usually divided into two distinct sub-
periods. The former period, which extends up to the end of the Volcker disin ation, is
characterised by a signicant extent of macroeconomic turbulence, with highly volatile
in ation and output growth. The latter period, from the end of the Volcker disin ation
up to the present day, is marked in contrast by signicantly smaller volatilities for both
in ation and output growth. These dramatic changes in the reduced-form properties
of the U.S. economy over the last several decades characterise a phenomenon known
as the ‘Great Moderation’.1
A vast empirical literature has investigated the source(s) of the Great Moderation
in an attempt to disentangle the relative contributions of two main explanations:
good policy and good luck. Based on (time-varying or Markov-switching) structural
VAR methods, the good luck hypothesis has been advocated by a number of authors
including Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and
Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) (the disaggregated analysis of Mojon (2007),
based on a Markov-switching structural VAR, nds however an important role for
the unsystematic component of monetary policy in fostering the Great Moderation).
Based on estimated sticky-price DSGE models of the U.S. economy, both Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) nd, in contrast, support for the
good policy explanation originally advocated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000),
a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c has h i f ti nt h es y s t e m a t i cc o m p o n e n to fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yh a sb e e n
the driving force behind the recent, greater macroeconomic stability.
This paper tries to reconcile the two con icting sets of results by asking whether
methodological dierences between the two approaches might account for the dier-
ences in their outcomes. In order to investigate the ability of structural VAR methods
to correctly identify the sources of the Great Moderation, we use as data-generation
process a New Keynesian model in which–in line with Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–the only sources of change are the move
from passive to active monetary policy,2 and the presence of sunspots under indeter-
minacy. We estimate the model via Bayesian methods, and we explore the theoretical
properties of the estimated structure.
1.1 Main results
Our main results may be summarised as follows.
• The shift in the systematic component of monetary policy associated with the
1See in particular Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
2As we abstract from the role of scal policy, the relationship between the monetary policy
stance and equilibrium (in)determinacy in a simple New-Keynesian model is one-to-one, with a
passive (active) rule associated with an indeterminate (determinate) equilibrium. As shown by
Leeper (1991), in more complex settings this is not the case.8
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move from indeterminacy to determinacy is su!cient to generate, in population,
(i) decreases in the innovation variances for all series, and (ii) decreases in
the variances of in ation and the output gap, as a simple implication of the
Lucas (1976) critique, and without any need of sunspot shocks. With sunspot
shocks, the estimated model exhibits decreases in both variances and innovation
variances in population when moving from indeterminacy to determinacy, thus
replicating the key features of the Great Moderation.
• Policy counterfactuals based on the theoretical structural VAR representations
of the model under the two regimes fail to capture the truth. In particular,
substituting the VAR’s structural monetary rule corresponding to the indeter-
minacy regime into the VAR for the determinacy regime causes a volatility
decrease–rather than an increase–for two series out of three.
• Impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock exhibit little change
across regimes.
Overall, our results suggests that existing VAR evidence is, in principle, uninfor-
mative on the issue of the role played by monetary policy in the Great Moderation,
and is compatible with the notion that policy played a crucial role in fostering the
greater macroeconomic stability of recent years.
1.2 Explaining the results
We identify two key dimensions along which VAR analysis turns out to be misleading.
First, in general, changes in the coe!cients of the monetary policy rule of the
DSGE model exert their impact on both the coe!cients of the VAR representation of
the model, and t h ee l e m e n t so ft h eV A R ’ sc o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo fr e d u c e d - f o r mi n n o -
vations. Although this is a well-known implication of the Lucas (1976) critique, this
point has generally been overlooked in the structural VAR-based empirical literature
on the Great Moderation, which has routinely interpreted changes in the volatilities
of the reduced-form innovations, accompanied by weak evidence of changes in the
VAR’s coe!cients, as evidence against good policy, and in favor of good luck. As this
paper shows, however, the dominant impact of a change in the systematic component
of monetary policy may well turn out to be the one on the elements of the VAR’s
covariance matrix, with a comparatively milder eect on the VAR’s coe!cients. As a
corollary, this logically implies that this kind of evidence does not allow, in principle,
to discriminate among the good policy and good luck explanations, simply because,
within our data generation process, they are essentially observationally equivalent.
Second, changes in the interest rate equation (i.e, the monetary policy rule) of
a structural VAR bear no clear-cut relationship with changes in the parameters of
the monetary policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. To put it dierently, there
appears to be a fundamental disconnect between what is structural within a DSGE9
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model, and what is dened as structural based on the structural VAR representation
implied by the very same DSGE model. Earlier contributions, on the other hand,
have performed counterfactual simulations in structural VARs under the implicit
presumption that switching the estimated coe!cients of the interest rate equations
in the structural VAR provides a reasonable approximation to the authentic policy
counterfactual, i.e. the one you obtain by switching the parameters of the monetary
policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. Again, as the present work shows, such
a presumption is, in general, unjustied.
Finally, the present work contribues to the literature along another dimension,
by identifying a crucial, and previously unnoticed dierence between the determi-
nacy and indeterminacy regimes for New Keynesian models. In particular, under
indeterminacy the equivalent minimal state-space representation of the DSGE model
possesses an additional state variable compared with the determinacy regime.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the standard New Keyne-
sian model we use in the paper, and discusses details of both the Bayesian estimation
procedure and the specic experiment we construct. Section 3 discusses key theoret-
ical properties of the estimated data-generation process, focusing on the dierence
between the equivalent minimal state-space representations of the model under the
two regimes, which imply that the model possesses a VAR representation under de-
terminacy, and a VARMA one under inderminacy. Section 4 shows hos the estimated
structure replicates key aspects of the Great Moderation in population. Section 5
shows how neither structural VAR-based policy counterfactuals, nor impulse-response
functions to a monetary policy shock, point towards the authentic cause of changes
in the data-generation process. Section 6 concludes.
2 Assessing VAR Studies of the Great Moderation
In order to assess the ability of structural VAR methods to correctly identify the
causes of the Great Moderation, we consider the following experiment:
Suppose that the Great Moderation in the United States has been exclusively due to
improved monetary policy, with a passive monetary policy regime in place before Octo-
ber 1979, and an active regime in place thereafter. Would structural VAR techniques
be capable of uncovering the authentic causes of the changes in the data-generation
process?
As we will see, the answer is ‘No’, with structural VAR methods clearly pointing
towards ‘good luck’–i.e., an exogenous reduction in the variance of the structural
shocks–as the true underlying cause of the changes in the DGP, in spite of the fact
that, by construction, everything is here driven by improved monetary policy.10
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2.1 The model
T h em o d e lw eu s ei nw h a tf o l l o w si sg i v e nb y







w31 + |w + >w (2)
|w = |w+1|w +( 1 )|w31  
31(Uw  w+1|w)+|>w (3)
where Uw, w and |w are the nominal interest rate, in ation, and the output gap,
respectively;  and  are price setters’ extent of indexation to past in ation3 and the
forward-looking component in the intertemporal IS curve, respectively;  is the slope
of the Philips curve;  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption;
, !,a n d!| are the smoothing coe!cient and the long-run coe!cients on in ation
a n dt h eo u t p u tg a pi nt h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l e ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ;a n d>w, |>w,a n dU>w
are three structural disturbances following the AR(1) processes {>w={{>w31+˜ {>w,f o r
{=, |, U,w i t h˜ {>w  Q(0, 2
{).
2.1.1 Model solution under determinacy and indeterminacy
By dening the state vector as w  [Uw, w, |w, w+1|w, |w+1|w, U>w, >w, |>w]0,t h ev e c t o r
collecting the structural shocks as w  [˜ U>w, ˜ >w, ˜ |>w]0, and the vector of forecast




w  w-w|w31 and 
|
w  |w-|w|w31,t h em o d e lc a nt h e n
be put into the ‘Sims canonical form’4
K0w = K1w31 + [w + w (4)
where K0, K1, [ and  are matrices conformable to w, w and w.
In order to solve the model under both determinacy and indeterminacy, following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) we exploit the T] decomposition of the matrix pencil
(K0-K1). Specically, given a pencil (K0-K1), there exist matrices T, ], \,a n dl
such that TT0=T0T=]]0=]0]=Lq, \ and l are upper triangular, \=TK0],a n d





















([w + w) (5)
where the vector of generalised eigenvalues,  (equal to the ratio between the diagonal




2]0,w i t h2 collecting all
the explosive eigenvalues, and l, \,a n dT have been partitioned accordingly. In
3See e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The specic
formulation we use herein is Smets and Wouters’.
4See Sims (2002).11
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particular, Tm· collects the blocks of rows corresponding to the stable (m=1) and,













{=T2·. Given that 2 is purely explosive, obtaining a stable
solution to (4) requires z2>w to be equal to 0 for any w 0. This can be accomplished
by setting z2>0=0, and by selecting, for each wA 0, the forecast error vector w in such
aw a yt h a t[W
{w + W
{w=0.
Under determinacy, the dimension of w is exactly equal to the number of unstable
eigenvalues, and w is therefore uniquely determined. Under indeterminacy, on the
other hand, the number of unstable eigenvalues falls short of the number of forecast
errors, and the forecast error vector w is therefore not uniquely determined, which is
at the root of the possibility of sunspot  uctuations. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003),
however, prove the following. By dening XGY0=W
{ as the singular value decom-
position of W
{, and by assuming that for each w there always exists an w such that
[W
{w + W














where G11 is the upper-left diagonal block of G, containing the square roots of the
non-zero singular values of W
{ in decreasing order; vW
w is a vector of sunspot shocks; and
P1 and P2 are matrices whose entries are not determined by the solution procedure,
and which basically ‘index’ (or parameterise) the model’s solution under indetermi-
nacy. Concerning P1 and P2 we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), rst, by setting
P2vW
w=vw,w h e r evw can therefore be interpreted as a vector of ‘reduced-form’ sunspot
shocks. Second, we choose the matrix P1 in such a way as to preserve continuity of
the impact matrices of the impulse-responses of the model at the boundary between
the determinacy and the indeterminacy region. Specically, let  be the parameters’
vector, and let XL and XG be the sets of all the ’s corresponding to the indeterminacy
and, respectively, to the determinacy regions. For every  5 XL we identify a corre-
sponding vector ˜  5 XG laying just on the boundary between the two regions.5 By
denition, the two impact matrices for the impulse-responses of the model conditional














5Specically, for any [!, !|]0 such that  5 L, we choose the vector [˜ !, ˜ !|]0, such that the
resulting ˜  5 G lies just on the boundary between the two regions, by minimising the criterion
˜ F=[(!-˜ !)2+(!|-˜ !|)2]1@2. It is important to stress that, in general, there is no clear-cut criterion
for choosing a specic vector on the boundary. Minimisation of ˜ F is based on the intuitive notion
of taking, as the ‘benchmark’ ˜ , the one that is closest in vector 2-norm to .12
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{(˜ )  E1(˜ ) (10)
where [W(·)  T[(·),a n dW(·)  T(·). We minimise the dierence between the
two impact matrices, E1(˜ )-[E1()+E2()P1]=[E1(˜ )-E1()]-E2()P1 by means of a
least-squares regression of [E1(˜ )-E1()] on E2(), thus obtaining ˜ P1=[E2()0E2()]31×
E2()0[E1(˜ )-E1()].
The solution to (1)-(3) is now completely characterised. The forecast error w can
be substituted into the law of motion for z1>w,
z1>w = \
31
11 l11z1>w31 + \
31
11 T1· ([w + w) (11)
thus obtaining, under both regimes, a VAR(1) representation for w,
w = D0w31 + E0xw (12)
where xw is vector standard white noise. Finally, the state-space representation of
the model in terms of the three observable variables, Uw, w, |w, implies the following
observation equation
\w = F0w (13)
with \w  [Uw, w, |w]0 and F0=[L3 03×(Q033)],w h e r eQ0 is the dimension of the state
vector. (Notice that, in terms of the canonical ‘A-B-C-D’ representation of a state-
s p a c ef o r m ,t h em a t r i xD0 is here equal to D0=03×3.)
2.1.2 The experiment’s design
Our goal is to assess the performance of (structural) VARs conditional on a DGP
in which neither luck (i.e., changes in the volatilities of the structural shocks), nor
structural change (in the present case, changes in the non-policy parameters, , , ,
,a n da l lo ft h e{’s), play any role whatsoever.
We therefore estimate (1)-(3)
• imposing indeterminacy for the pre-October 1979 period and determinacy for
the period following the end of the Volcker stabilisation, by allowing for dierent
values of , !,a n d!| across periods;
• imposing that , , , ,a l lo ft h e{’ s ,a n da l lo ft h e2
{’s, be identical across
regimes. This is obtained by jointly estimating the two models for the pre-
October 1979 and the post-Volcker stabilisation periods.
By showing that this DGP can replicate the key features of the Great Moderation,
our results will illustrate, in the starkest possible way, that existing VAR evidence is
compatible with the good policy explanation of the Great Moderation.13
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2.2 Bayesian estimation
We estimate (1)-(3) via Bayesian methods. The following two sub-sections describe
our choices for the priors, and the Random-Walk Metropolis algorithm we use to get
draws from the posterior.
2.2.1 Priors
Following, e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and An and Schorfheide (2006), all
structural parameters are assumed, for the sake of simplicity, to be ap r i o r iindepen-
dent from one another. The third column of Table 1 reports the parameters’ prior
densities, whereas the fourth and the fth columns report two key objects character-
i s i n gt h e m ,t h em o d ea n dt h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n .D i erent from the vast majority
of the papers in the literature, we calibrate the Gamma, inverse Gamma, and Beta
prior densities in terms of the mode of the distribution, rather than in terms of the
mean (specically, we calibrate the densities so that our ‘preferred values’ for the
parameters of interest are equal to the mode). The key reason for doing so is in order
to give the maximal amount of prior weight to our ‘preferred values’, which, on the
other hand, would not be the case if calibration were performed in such a way as to
make the densities’ means equal to such values.
2.2.2 Getting draws from the posterior via Random-Walk Metropolis
We numerically maximise the log posterior–dened as ln O(|\ )+l nS(), where
 is the vector collecting the model’s structural parameters, O(|\ ) is the likelihood
of  conditional on the data, and S()i st h ep r i o r – via simulated annealing (for a
full description of the methodology, see Appendix A.1) We then generate draws from
the posterior distribution of the model’s structural parameters via the Random Walk
Metropolis (henceforth, RWM) algorithm as described in, e.g., An and Schorfheide
(2006). In implementing the RWM algorithm we exactly follow An and Schorfheide
(2006, Section 4.1), with the single exception of the method we use to calibrate the
covariance matrix’s scale factor–the parameter c below–for which we follow the
methodology described in Appendix D.3 of Benati (2008), which is brie y described
in Appendix A.2 below.
Let then ˆ  and ˆ P be the mode of the maximised log posterior and its estimated
Hessian, respectively.6 We start the Markov chain of the RWM algorithm by drawing

(0) from Q(ˆ , f2ˆ P). For v = 1, 2, ..., Q we then draw ˜  from the proposal distribution
Q(
(v31), f2ˆ P), accepting the jump (i.e., 
(v) = ˜ ) with probability min {1, u(
(v31),









6We compute ˆ 	 numerically as in An and Schorfheide (2006).14
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We run a burn-in sample of 200,000 draws which we then discard. After that, we run
a sample of 200,000 draws, keeping every draw out of 100 in order to decrease the
draws’ autocorrelation, thus ending up with a sample of 2,000 draws.
Table 1 reports the modes and the 90%-coverage percentiles of the distributions
of the model’s structural parameters.
3 Theoretical Properties of the Estimated Data-
Generation Process
In this Section we explore the theoretical properties of the estimated data-generation
process under the two regimes, by analysing the structural VAR(MA) representations
of the model, the structural innovations’ theoretical impact matrices and impulse-
response functions, the VAR(MA)’s reduced-form innovation variances, and the se-
ries’ theoretical variances under determinacy and indeterminacy. By focusing on the
theoretical properties of the DGP, we will therefore show that the ability of Clarida et
al.’s ‘indeterminacy hypothesis’ to replicate the broad features of the Great Modera-
tion as a consequence of a shift in monetary policy has nothing to do with estimation
issues–sample length, choice of the lag order, etc.–but it rather holds in population.
In order to make the exposition clearer, however, it is useful to start with the
model’s theoretical equivalent minimal state-space representation under the two regimes.
3.1 The equivalent minimal state-space representations of
the model under the two regimes
Conditional on the estimates reported in Table 1, the theoretical state-space repre-
sentations of the model under the two regimes can easily be computed. By applying
MATLAB’s routine ss.m to the two state-space forms we then obtain the two equiv-





9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
7
0.68 -0.31 0.28 -0.09 0.09 0.01 0.00
0.30 0.61 0.07 0.11 -0.10 -0.01 0.00
0.42 0.04 0.58 -0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00
-0.32 0.08 -0.12 0.29 -0.24 0.01 0.00
0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.31 0.53 0.05 0.00
0.19 -0.12 -0.25 -0.20 1.10 0.43 0.02
0.71 -0.47 0.66 0.34 0.00 -0.03 0.40
6










9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
7
0.55 0.15 0.3968 -0.11
0.15 0.57 0.5881 0.16
0.47 -0.08 0.24 -0.08
0.00 -0.08 0.24 -0.08
-0.27 0.30 -0.03 -0.11
-0.15 1.28 -0.29 -0.03
1.54 0.09 -0.30 0.03
6






0.08 -0.67 -0.67 0.22 -0.21 -0.02 0.00
0.00 -0.06 0.09 0.38 0.35 -0.64 -0.56










9 9 9 9 9 9
7
0.78 0.16 0.18 -0.20 -0.02 0.00
0.36 0.51 0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00
-0.19 0.00 0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.00
0.14 -0.11 -0.26 0.46 0.04 0.00
0.24 -0.40 0.09 0.73 0.39 0.02
-0.11 0.42 0.72 -0.44 -0.08 0.40
6






















-0.67 -0.66 0.23 -0.21 -0.02 0.00
-0.04 0.08 0.38 0.33 -0.64 -0.57





under determinacy, where 
P
w is the state vector in the EMSSR,7 and \w is still equal
to \w  [Uw, w, |w]0. A comparison between (14)-(15) and (16)-(17) immediately
highlights a fundamental dierence between the two regimes. Whereas under deter-
minacy the EMSSR has six states, under indeterminacy it has seven.( T h ef a c tt h a t ,
under indeterminacy, the EMSSR possesses an additional state variable compared
with the determinacy regime was rst shown in a previous version of this paper that
was presented at the New York FED on September 27th, 2006. The slides of the
presentation are available from either of us, while the paper is available either from
us, or from the New York FED.) An important point to stress is that the presence of
an additional state variable under indeterminacy has nothing to do with the presence
of a sunspot shock. Indeed, rst, it can be easily shown that this feature of the DGP
remains unchanged even if we set the variance of the sunpot shock to zero. Second,
and more fundamentally, given that the sunspot shock is pure white noise, on strictly
logical/mathematical grounds it cannot belong to the state vector, so that the addi-
tional state under indeterminacy ought to be something else.8 Rather, the presence
7In general, the states of the EMSSR generated by MATLAB’s routine ss.m do not have any
intrinsic meaning whatsoever, as they are simply linear combinations of the states of the original
state-space form.
8For an extensive discussion of what the additional state variable under indeterminacy exactly
is, see the Appendix B.16
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of an additional state under indeterminacy is a general property of New Keynesian
models under this regime.
3.2 The VARMA representations
Such nding has the following important implication. Since, once the EMSSR has
been appropriately rotated,9 three of the states in 
P
w are equal to the three structural
disturbances, this automatically implies that under determinacy, with six states in the
EMSSR, the model possesses a VAR representation in Uw, w,a n d|w. Indeed, applying
to the EMSSR of the model under determinacy a MATLAB code for computing

































Under indeterminacy, on the other hand, the very same logic implies that, with one
additional state variable in the EMSSR, the model does not possess a pure VAR rep-
resentation in Uw, w,a n d|w, but rather a VARMA one, with a small moving-average
component. Figure 1 illustrates this, by showing the evolution of the coe!cients of
the theoretical VAR(4) implied by the VARMA representation of the model under
indeterminacy, as a function of the lag. A simple illustration of the speed of decay to-
wards zero of the coe!cients of the VAR(4) representation of the model is provided
by the evolution of the maximum among the absolute values of the elements of the AR
matrices of the VAR(4). At the rst three lags, such maximum is equal to 1.0561,
0.2463, and 0.0513, respectively, whereas at lags 10 and 20 it decreases to 0.014 and
2.2E-3, respectively, and at lags 50, 75, and 100 it further declines to 8.6E-6, 8.4E-8,
and 1.6E-9, respectively. Finally, the covariance matrix of reduced-form innovations
of the VARMA representation of the model obtained when setting the sunspot shock









9In general, state-space forms are unique up to a rotation–see the discussion in Appendix B.
10The code has been kindly supplied by Juan Rubio-Ramirez.17
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3.3 Impulse-response functions of the model under the two
regimes
Figure 2 plots the theoretical impulse-response functions (henceforth, IRFs) of the
model under the two regimes. As the gure shows, in most cases the dierences
between the the IRFs under determinacy and indeterminacy is far from dramatic–
in a few cases it is essentially trivial–thus pointing towards intrinsic di!culties in
distinguishing between the two regimes based on an analysis of the IRFs.
4 Replicating the Great Moderation
4.1 Volatility decreases in population
A comparison between the diagonal elements of (19) and (18) shows that the shift in
the systematic component of monetary policy associated with the move from indeter-
minacy to determinacy is su!cient to generate decreases in the theoretical innova-
tion variances for all series as a simple implication of the Lucas (1976) critique, and
without any need of sunspot shocks. Whereas earlier contributions have interpreted
decreases in reduced-form innovation variances as prima facie evidence in favor of
good luck, and against good policy, our results clearly show such interpretation to be
unwarrented. Further, such policy shift is associated with decreases in the standard
deviations of both in ation and the output gap, from 1.32 to 1.23 and from 2.11
to 1.88 respectively, whereas the standard deviation of the interest rate slightly in-
creases from 1.65 to 1.72. With the estimated standard deviation of sunspot shocks,
the model exhibits clear decreases in both variances and innovation variances when
moving from indeterminacy to determinacy. In particular, the theoretical standard
deviations of Uw, w,a n d|w under indeterminacy become equal to 4.41, 4.38, 2.48,
respectively, thus highlighting the ability of the estimated DGP to broadly replicate
the generalised decline in overall macroeconomic volatility associated with the Great
Moderation.
4.2 Generating ‘Great In ations’ and ‘Great Moderations’
Figure 3 provides a stark illustration of the ability of Clarida et al.’s ‘indeterminacy
hypothesis’ to replicate the transition from the Great In ation to the Great Modera-
tion uniquely as a result of improved monetary policy, by plotting a single stochastic
simulation of length W=100 for both regimes from the estimated model. As the gure
shows, the rst part of the sample exhibits what, at rst blush, clearly looks like a
‘Great In ation’ episode, with both in ation and the nominal rate displaying wide
and persistent swings, reaching peaks around twelve-thirteen per cent.11 In the sec-
11This is conceptually in line with Clarida et al.’s (2000) Figure V on page 172.18
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ond half of the sample, on the other hand,  uctuations are much more subdued, and
do not exhibit any persistent deviation from equilibrium.
5 Can Structural VAR Methods Uncover the Truth?
When applied to the estimated model, can structural VAR methods uncover the
authentic causes of the changes in the DGP across regimes? As this section shows,
the answer is unfortunately ‘No’.
5.1 Theoretical structural policy counterfactuals
We start by analysing theoretical policy counterfactuals, i.e. counterfactuals based on
the theoretical VAR representations of the model under the two regimes. By showing
that structural VAR methods fail to correctly capture the truth in population, we will
therefore illustrate in the starkest possible way that the problems discussed in the
present work have nothing to do with estimation issues–i.e, lag order selection and
the like–but rather point towards fundamental weaknesses of the structural VAR
approach for the present purposes.
As we pointed out in Section 3.2, the model possesses a VAR(2) representation
under determinacy, and a VARMA one with a small moving-average component un-
der indeterminacy. We start by approximating the VAR(4)i m p l i e db yt h eV A R M A
representation under indeterminacy with a VAR(100),12 and we augment the VAR(2)
under determinacy with 98 further AR matrices equal to 03×3. Based on the struc-
tural shocks’ theoretical impact matrices for the two regimes, we then put the two
theoretical VARs into the corresponding structural VAR forms,
D
31
0>LQG\w = ˜ E
LQG
1 \w31=== + ˜ E
LQG
100 \w3100 + w (20)
D
31
0>GHW\w = ˜ E
GHW
1 \w31=== + ˜ E
GHW





m ,w i t h{ = LQG, GHW (with LQG for ‘indeterminacy’ and GHW
‘determinacy’), D
31
0>{ being the impact matrix of the three structural shocks (˜ U>w, ˜ >w,
˜ |>w)a tz e r o ,a n dm = 0, 1, ..., 100. A crucial point to stress is that, since we are here
working with the impact matrices of the three structural shocks, we are implicitly
setting the variance of the sunspot shock to zero–to put it dierently, the version
of the model we are working in this sub-section is the one without sunspots. By
illustrating the failure of structural VAR-based policy counterfactuals to capture the
truth even in the absence of sunspot shocks, we will therefore show that the problems
discussed in this sub-sections have nothing to do with the presence of sunspot shocks,
and rather pertain to a fundamental problem of VAR-based policy counterfactuals.
12As we pointed out in Section 3.2, at lag 100 the maximum among the absolute values of the
elements of the AR matrix of the VAR(4) is of an order of magnitude of 1011, which implies that
all lags beyond the 100th can safely be ignored.19
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After switching the structural monetary rules in the two structural VARs–i.e.,
the rst equations in (20) and (21)–we convert the counterfactual structural VARs
we thus obtain into corresponding counterfactual reduced-form VARs, from which
theoretical counterfactual standard deviations for the three series can trivially be
computed. As we pointed out in Section 4.1, under determinacy the true theoretical
standard deviations are equal to 1.72, 1.23, and 1.88 respectively. Quite strikingly,
the theoretical counterfactual standard deviations we obtain by imposing the struc-
tural monetary rule corresponding to the indeterminacy regime onto the structural
VAR for the determinacy regime13 are equal to 1.21, 1.22, and 1.92, thus implying
a volatility decrease for two series out of three, rather than an increase. Results
from the alternative counterfactual in which we impose the structural monetary rule
corresponding to the determinacy regime onto the structural VAR for the indetermi-
nacy regime14 are equally striking. Whereas, under indeterminacy, the true standard
deviations of the three series are equal to 4.41, 4.38, and 2.48, respectively, the coun-
terfactual standard deviations we obtain via the policy switch are equal to 16.84,
9.47, and 2.12 respectively, thus implying a volatility increase for two series out of
three, rather than a decrease, thus highlighting, once again, the failure of structural
VAR-based policy counterfactuals to capture the truth.
5.1.1 Why do structural-VAR based policy counterfactuals fail?
What is going on here? Why do structural-VAR based policy counterfactuals fail so
badly in population? The reason is not di!cult to grasp, and is the following. When
performing counterfactual simulations in structural VARs, the implicit presumption is
that switching the VAR’s estimated structural policy rules should provide a reasonable
approximation to the authentic policy switch, i.e. the one between the Taylor rules
in the underlying DSGE model. As our results show, however, such presumption is,
in general, unwarranted, the key reason being that what is structural as dened by
the underlying DSGE model bears no clear-cut connection with what is dened as
‘structural’ by the structural VAR form of the very same DSGE model, i.e. equations
(20) and (21). The dierence between these two notions of what is structural is at the
root of the problem here, and cannot therefore be ‘xed’, being rather a fundamental
shortcoming of policy counterfactuals based on structural VARs.
This problem of structural-VAR based policy counterfactuals is extensively analysed
by Benati (2007). Taking a standard New Keynesian model as DGP, he explores the
conditions under which SVAR-based policy counterfactuals may provide a reasonably
good approximation to the ‘authentic’ policy switch, i.e. the one between the Tay-
lor rules in the New Keynesian model. As he shows, such conditions are extremely
restrictive, to the point that structural VAR-based policy counterfactuals should in
general be regarded as unreliable. The logical corollary of this result is that all results
13I.e, the counterfactual in which we ‘bring Arthur Burns into the post-Volcker stabilisation era’.
14I.e, we ‘bring Paul Volcker or Alan Greenspan back in time’.20
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from structural VAR-based policy counterfactuals should be regarded as uninforma-
tive for the issue of properly assessing the role played by monetary policy in fostering
the Great Moderation.
5.2 Impulse-response functions
Let’s now turn to IRFs. Little change over time in estimated IRFs to an identied
monetary policy shock has been traditionally regarded as evidence in favor of good
luck, and against good policy. As we will now show, such evidence is, once again,
uninformative for the issue of deciding the role played by monetary policy in fostering
the Great Moderation.
Figure 4 shows, for the two regimes, the medians and the 90%-coverage percentiles
of the distributions of the estimated IRFs to a 100 basis points monetary policy shock,
based on 1,000 stochastic simulations. Specically, for each of the 1,000 simulations
(i) we generated articial data under the two regimes from the estimated DGP
and we estimated reduced-form VARs exactly as in Section 4.2, choosing the lag order
b a s e do nt h eA I C .
(ii) Based on the VARs’ estimated covariance matrices, we estimate the structural
impact matrices for the two regimes by imposing the true theoretical sign restrictions15
via the procedure introduced by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005). We
integrate out rotation uncertainty by computing, for each of the 1,000 stochastic
simulations, 1,000 impact matrices satisfying the sign restrictions, and then taking
the average among them.
(ii) Based on the estimated VARs and the structural impact matrices, we compute
the IRFs to a 100 basis points shock to the interest rate.
Two main ndings emerge from the Figure. First, the distributions of the es-
timated IRFs under indeterminacy are much wider than those under determinacy.
This is especially clear for in ation and the nominal rate, much less so for the output
gap, and nds its origin in the greater persistence exhibited by the system under
indeterminacy. Second, for none of the series it is possible to reject the null that the
IRFs have remained unchanged across regimes.
Although little change in estimated IRFs to a monetary policy shock have rou-
tinely been interpreted as evidence in favor of good luck and against good policy,
these results show that this interpretation is unwarranted.
15The reason for using sign restrictions is that any other identication scheme (e.g., Cholesky)
would be false in population–in the sense of being inconsistent with the true data generation
process–so that its results could not be meaningfully interpreted in any way. This is conceptually
in line with Canova and Pina (2005).21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 866
February 2008
6 Some Criticisms of Our Analysis, and Our Re-
buttals
6.1 Canova’s criticism
Fabio Canova has circulated a note which is critical of the present work.16 He sum-
marises his main objections as follows:17
‘[N]one of the problems highlighted by Benati and Surico have to do
with VAR methods, per se. It is the choice of experimental design, failure
to recognize the presence of omitted variables in one regime and the choice
of relatively small sample size which drive the results they obtain.’
In what follows we show that most of Canova’s arguments are wrong, and none
of them aects our conclusions.
6.1.1 The additional state variable under indeterminacy
As we pointed out, the minimal state-space representation of the model has six state
variables under determinacy, and seven under indeterminacy. Canova (2006) states
that the additional state variable under indeterminacy is w+1|w (i.e. expected in ation
at time t+1, conditional on information available at time t),18 and based on this
conjecture makes two points.
• If you augment the VAR in in ation, the output gap and the nominal interest
rate with expected in ation, the augmented VAR may uncover the true causes
of change in the DGP.
• If you integrate out the presence of the unobserved state variable under indeter-
minacy, the variances of the series are much lower, so that the model cannot
replicate the Great Moderation (see footnote 1, and the variances reported in
Table 1 of Canova’s comment).
Concerning the rst point, Canova and Gambetti (2007) take Canova’s conjecture
as the rationale for including measures of expected in a t i o ni nt h e i r( xed-coe!cient
and time-varying parameters) VARs. Given that, overall, their results are largely
unaected by the inclusion of expected in ation measures, they conclude that their
16See Canova (2006).
17See Canova (2006, page 12, second paragraph).
18To be precise, Canova (2006) is not explicit about what he actually means by ‘expected in ation’,
which he just labels as h
w. Although, in principle, he could mean either w+1|w or w|w1,t h el a t t e r
can be ruled out on strictly logical grounds. Given that w|w1 does not belong to the state vector
of the original state-space form, w, there is simply no way that it can belong to the state vector of
the EMSR, vw. The only possibility left is therefore w+1|w.22
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evidence runs against Clarida et al.’s (2000) indeterminacy hypothesis about the
sources of the Great Moderation.
The problem with Canova’s and Canova and Gambetti’s position is that, as we
demonstrate mathematically in Appendix B, the VAR representation they consider is
only one among an innity of admissible VAR representations for the economy, so that
their evidence is ultimately uninformative for the issue at hand. Another admissible
representation, for example, has expected in ation replaced by the expected output
gap, or by any linear (convex or non-convex) combination of the two. As a simple
corollary, this automatically implies that a negative result–like the one obtained
by Canova and Gambetti (2007)–is not telling us, in principle, anything: to be
informative, the negative outcome should be obtained for all the innite, possible
representations of the economy. What truly is informative under these circumstances,
on the other hand, is a positive result, i.e. the nding that a particular variable which
is admissible as the fourth element in the VAR representation of the model beyond
Uw, w,a n d|w does indeed Granger-cause the rst three variables, and/or produces
signicant changes in the results.
As for the second issue raised by Canova (2006), the crucial point to stress is
that the presence of an additional state variable under indeterminacy is an integral
part of the intrinsic dynamics of the system under that regime, so that it is simply
not possible to meaningfully talk of the dynamics of in ation, the interest rate, and
the output gap under indeterminacy ‘controlling’ for the eect of this additional
state. To make this point even clearer, consider the following simple example. Under
determinacy the dynamics of the economy only depends on three states, in ation, the
output gap, and the interest rate. Following Canova’s logic, we could say that ‘if we
control for (i.e, integrate out) the in uence of the interest rate, the variance of in ation
under determinacy would be lower’. The key problem with this is that ‘controlling
for the in uence of the interest rate’ does not have any meaning whatsoever, for
the simple reason that the interest rate–exactly like the additional unobserved state
variable under indeterminacy–is not exogenous, but it is rather endogenous to the
system. You might legitimately want to control for  uctuations in exogenous driving
processes, but controlling for the in uence of endogenous variables is meaningless.
6.1.2 The experimental design
Our paper considers a world in which the Great Moderation is exclusively driven by
improved monetary policy, and then asks: ‘When applied to the simulated data, are
the VAR methods used in earlier contributions capable of delivering the true answer
of good policy?’. Canova (2006), on the other hand, is concerned with a completely
dierent question: ‘ I si tp o s s i b l et os p e c i f yaD S G Em o d e la n dap o l i c ys h i f tf o rw h i c h
VAR analysis would uncover the true change in the DGP?19 Unfortunately, this is
19‘If one is interested in measuring the ability of VAR methods to answer the questions of interest,
one should also design an experiment where only the lagged coe!cients change. [...] To have23
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irrelevant for the issue at hand: the fact that I can conceive circumstamces under
which a specic econometric methodology performs well does not tell me anything
about its performance conditional on the only DGP that truly matters, i.e. the one
which is out there. The reason is very simple: reality is what it is, and you can’t
‘choose’ it to suit the econometric methodologies that you like. As a consequence, in
order to be reasonably condent that the results produced by a specice c o n o m e t r i c
methodology are su!ciently reliable, such methodology must be shown to perform
well conditional on a wide range of plausible data-generation processes. As this paper
has shown, however, if the truth for the post-WWII United States is reasonably
well described, to a rst approximation, by Clarida et al.’s (2000) ‘indeterminacy
hypothesis’, VAR methods as they have been implemented so far may well point
towards the incorrect conclusion of good luck. And this automatically implies that
existing VAR evidence is uninformative for the issue at hand: if I always get good
luck irrespective of what the truth is, such result is quite obviously uninformative
for the issue at hand. The notion that a researcher may therefore pick and choose
a specic DGP in order to show that, conditional on that DGP, his/her favorite
econometric methodology performs well does therefore not appear to us a meaningful
way of discriminating between what works and what doesn’t work.
6.1.3 VARs do have problems
As we already pointed out, one of Canova’s key contentions is that ‘[...] none of
the problems highlighted by Benati and Surico have to do with VAR methods, per
se.’ On this, we very much disagree: VAR methods do have problems which are
intrinsic to this methodology. As we stressed in the introduction, indeed, there are
two key dimensions along which VAR analysis turns out to be misleading within
the present context. First, in general, changes in the coe!cients of the monetary
policy rule of the DSGE model exert their impact on both the coe!cients of the
VAR representation of the model, and the elements of the VAR’s covariance matrix
of reduced-form innovations. Here there’s not much that one can quibble with this:
the fact that a change in the parameters of the Taylor rule also exerts an impact on
the the VAR’s covariance matrix is nothing but a trivial consequence of the Lucas
(1976) critique, and as such it is not possible to argue with it. Second, in general,
changes in the monetary policy rule of a structural VAR bear no clear-cut relationship
with changes in the parameters of the monetary policy rule in the underlying DSGE
model. To put it dierently, there appears to be a fundamental disconnect between
what is structural within a DSGE model, and what is dened as structural based
on the structural VAR representation implied by the very same DSGE model. This
is a fundamental conceptual weakness of the structural VAR methodology, so that
a design with the required features, one should study within regime changes when the nominal
interest rate reacts to lagged output gap and lagged in ation since, by construction, the matrix of
impact coe!cients is xed across regimes while the matrix of lagged coe!cients changes’ (Canova,
2006, page 7, third paragraph).24
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Canova’s contention that such problems have nothing to do with VAR methods per
se is simply incorrect. This is a problem that lies at the very heart of the structural
VAR methodology. It is also to be noticed that–as extensively discussed by Benati
(2007)–this has nothing to do with Lucas critique-type problems, for the simple
reason that, whereas the Lucas critique’s key theme is the dierence between what
is structural and what is reduced-form, the fundamental issue here is the dierence
between what truly is structural, as dened by the DSGE model, and what is labelled
as structural within the structural VAR representation implied by the very same
DSGE model.
6.1.4 The sample size
The original version of the paper Canova refers to was entirely based on stochas-
tic simulations. Although the present version’s analysis is done almost entirely in
population–i.e., it is based on theoretical quantities–it is instructive to tackle this
issue too.
In the original version we simulated the New-Keynesian model using 100 observa-
tions per regime, which, at the quarterly frequency, corresponds to 25 years of data.
VAR analyses of the Great Moderation begin the sample period either at the end of
the 1950s or at the beginning of the 1960s and typically split the full sample around
O c t o b e r1 9 7 9 . T h es a m p l es e l e c t i o ni m p l i e st h a tt h ei n f e r e n c ed r a w no nt h eV A R
estimates is based on 20 years of data for the ‘bad policy’ regime, and 20-25 years
for the ‘good policy’ regime. Our choice of 100 observations was therefore perfectly
in line with the number of data points available to the econometrician–indeed, this
was precisely t h er e a s o nw h yw ec h o s ei t !
But at the end of the day this issue is irrelevant, as the present analysis is almost
entirely based
6.2 A further criticism
A further criticism has been oered, so far, of the present analysis. The work of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), upon which
the present analysis is based, treats the shift from the rst to the second regime
as ‘once-and-for-all’, rather than as an ongoing process. As pointed out, e.g., by
Davig and Leeper,20 ‘[o]nce-and-for-all shifts, by denition, are unanticipated, yet
once the shift occurs, agents are assumed to believe the new regime is permanent
and alternative regimes are impossible. But if regime has changed, then regime
can change; knowing this, private agents will ascribe a probability distribution to
regimes. Expectations formation and, therefore, the resulting equilibria will re ect
agents’ beliefs that regime change is possible.’ The key point to understand, here, is
that the problems highlighted in this paper have nothing to do with the specicw a y
20See Davig and Leeper (2007).25
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in which policy changes are modelled–‘once-and-for-all’, as opposed to an ongoing
process–and as a result should be expected to carry over, as a simple matter of
logic, even within more realistic settings like those investigated by Davig and Leeper
(2007).
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Most analyses of the U.S. Great Moderation have been based on structural VAR
methods, and have consistently pointed towards good luck as the main explanation
for the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years. Based on an estimated New-
Keynesian model in which the only sources of change are the move from passive
to active monetary policy, and the presence of sunspots under indeterminacy, we
show that VARs may misinterpret good policy for good luck. In particular, the
estimated DGP exhibits decreases in population in both variances and innovation
variances for all series. Policy counterfactuals based on the theoretical structural
VAR representations of the model under the two regimes fail to capture the truth,
whereas impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock exhibit little change
across regimes. Since these results are in line with those found in the structural VAR-
based literature on the Great Moderation, our analysis suggests that existing VAR
evidence is compatible with the ‘good policy’ explanation of the Great Moderation.26
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A Two Technical Aspects of the Bayesian Estima-
tion Procedure
This appendix discusses in detail two technical aspects the Bayesian estimation pro-
cedure.
A.1 Numerical maximisation of the log posterior
We numerically maximise the log posterior–dened as ln O(|\ )+l nS(), where
 is the vector collecting the model’s structural parameters, O(|\ ) is the likelihood
of  conditional on the data, and S()i st h ep r i o r – via simulated annealing. Fol-
lowing Goe, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) we implement simulated annealing via the
algorithm proposed by Corana, Marchesi, Martini, and Ridella (1987), setting the
key parameters to W0=100,000, uW=0.9, Qw=5, Qv=20, =1036, Q=4, where W0 is
the initial temperature, uW is the temperature reduction factor, Qw is the number of
times the algorithm goes through the Qv loops before the temperature starts being
reduced, Qv is the number of times the algorithm goes through the function before
adjusting the stepsize,  is the convergence (tolerance) criterion, and Q is number of
times convergence is achieved before the algorithm stops. Finally, initial conditions
were chosen stochastically by the algorithm itself, while the maximum number of
functions evaluations, set to 1,000,000, was never achieved.
A.2 Calibrating the covariance matrix scale factor
A key problem in implementing Metropolis algorithms is how to calibrate the covari-
ance matrix’s scale factor–the parameter f in subsection _._–in order to achieve
an acceptance rate of the draws close to the ideal one (in high dimensions) of 0.23.
Typically the problem is tackled by starting with some ‘reasonable’ value for f,a n d
adjusting it after a certain number of iterations during the initial burn-in period.
Specically, given that the draws’ acceptance rate is decreasing in f, f gets increased
(decreased) if the initial acceptance rate was too high (low). A problem with this ap-
proach is that it does not guarantee that after the adjustment the acceptance rate will
be reasonably close to the ideal one. The approach for calibrating f used in this paper,
on the other hand–which is the same used in Benati (2008)–is based on the idea
of estimating a reasonably good approximation to the inverse relationship between f
and the acceptance rate by running a pre-burn-in sample. Specically, let C be a grid
of possible values for f– i nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ec o n s i d e rag r i do v e rt h ei n t e r v a l[ 0 . 1 ,1 ]
with increments equal to 0.05. For each single value of f in the grid–call it fm–we run
n draws of the RWM algorithm as described in section 2.2.2, storing, for each fm,t h e
corresponding fraction of accepted draws, im.W et h e nt a third-order polynomial to
the im’s via least squares, and letting ˆ d0, ˆ d1, ˆ d2,a n dˆ d3 be the estimated coe!cients,29
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we choose f by solving numerically the equation ˆ d0+ˆ d1f+ˆ d2f2+ˆ d3f3=0.23. As the
fraction of accepted draws reported in Table 1 shows, the procedure works quite well.
B What Is the Additional State Variable Under
Indeterminacy?
B.1 Reframing the issue in the correct way
Although intuitively sensible, from a strictly mathematical point of view the question
‘What is the additional state variable under indeterminacy?’ is unfortunately not










–with \w still given by \w  [Uw, w, |w]0 and F=[L3 03×(Q33)],w h e r eQ is the dimen-
sion of 
P
w –is, for a given ‘input’ vector xw, observationally equivalent, in terms of
‘output’ vector \w, to the rotated state-space form
˜ 
P
w = ˜ D˜ w31 + ˜ Exw (B.3)
\w = ˜ F˜ w (B.4)
with ˜ w  Uw, ˜ D  UDU31, ˜ E  UE,a n d ˜ F  FU31. In plain English, this means
that for a given vector white noise input xw, we can obtain exactly the same identical
realisations for the observables via an innity of state-space forms, all of which are a
rotation of (B.1)-(B.2), and all of which are uniquely identied by a specicr o t a t i o n
matrix U.
So, from a mathematical point of view, asking oneself ‘what’ the states of a state-
space form exactly ‘are’ is, strictly speaking, meaningless. The correct way of framing
the issue is rather to focus directly on the VAR representation of the model. Let’s
start by dening as minimal VAR representation (henceforth, MVR) of the model
a VAR representation for which the number of variables in the VAR is the same
as the dimension of the state vector in the EMSSR minus the number of autore-
gressive disturbances–in the present case, three under determinacy and four under
indeterminacy.21 The crucial question then becomes:
‘If, under indeterminacy, the rst three variables in the MVR of the model are
Uw, w,a n d|w, what is the fourth?’.
In order to answer this question, we rst have to discuss a general mathematical
property of this class of models.
21The reason for focussing on the MVR is that (12), too, is a VAR representation of the model,
but it suers from the drawback of having an excess of variables.30
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B.2 Exploring the set of admissible minimal VAR represen-
tations of the DSGE model
For obvious reasons, researchers always and uniquely focus upon VAR representations
for DSGE models expressed in terms of observed variables–i.e., in the present case,
Uw, w,a n d|w. This, however, overlooks a fact which becomes crucial in the present
context: from a strictly mathematical point of view, the representation researchers
typically fous upon is only one among an innite number of admissible VAR repre-
sentations. As we will illustrate shortly, in the present case this has the important
implication that even if, under indeterminacy, we decide to arbitrarily restrict the
rst three variables in the MVR of the model to be Uw, w,a n d|w,22 still, the fourth
variable is entirely unconstrained, in the specic sense that it can be any linear com-
bination of the states in w
23 ( a sw ew i l le l a b o r a t eb e l o w ,w eh a v en oc r i t e r i at oc h o o s e
among them).
In order to illustrate this, let’s start from the fact that–as it can be trivially
shown–under both regimes it is possible to express the state vector of the original
state-space form, w, as a function of the state vector of the EMSSR, ˜ w:
w = N˜ w (B.5)
where the dimension of N is Q0 × Q.N o w ,l e tK be an Q × Q0 matrix subject to
t h eo n l yc o n s t r a i n tt h a t ˜ N  K · N be invertible, and let’s dene ˜ \w  Kw–in
plain English, ˜ \w is an arbitrary linear combination of the states in the original state-
space form. From (B.5) we therefore have that ˜ \w = ˜ Nvw,w i t h ˜ N being Q × Q= By
substituting vw = ˜ N31˜ \w in (B.1), we therefore obtain ˜ N31˜ \w = D ˜ N31˜ \w31+Exw,f r o m
which we get the set of all admissible MVRs of the model, ˜ \w = ˜ ND˜ N31˜ \w31+ ˜ NExw,
namely they
˜ \w = ˜ D˜ \w31 + ˜ Exw (B.6)
with ˜ D and ˜ E given by ˜ ND˜ N31 and ˜ NE, respectively.
Equation (B.6) expresses in mathematical form a fundamental principle: subject
to the only constraint that the matrix K be such that ˜ N be invertible, any MVR for
any linear combination of the states in the original state-space form is admissible–
t op u ti td i erently, the set of admissible MVRs of the DSGE models is of innite
dimension. Within the present context, this has the following implication. Even if,
under indeterminacy, we decide to set the rst three rows of K to [L3 03×1]–so that
the rst three elements of ˜ \w are Uw, w,a n d|w–still, the fourth element is entirely
unconstrained, in the sense that it can be any linear combination of the states in w,
subject to the only, previously mentioned invertibility constraint on ˜ N.T h ec r u c i a l
22This restriction is intuitively appealing, as it obviously makes sense to focus on observed vari-
ables, rather than on arbitrary linear combinations of observed and unobserved variables (see below).
Still, it is important to stress that, as we will show, it is, from a strictly mathematical point of view,
entirely arbitrary.
23Subject to the only trivial constraint that, in what follows, a specic matrix has to be invertible.31
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point to stress here is that, while we do have a compelling rationale for imposing
that the rst three elements of ˜ \w be Uw, w,a n d|w–they are the three observed
variables–we have, on the other hand, no rationale at all for making a similar choice
for the fourth element. Canova and Gambetti (2007) for example choose w+1|w,b u t
by the very same logic we could choose |w+1|w, or any linear combination of w+1|w and
|w+1|w, or, more generally, K4·w,w i t hK4· being a generic 1×Q vector.32
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Figure 1  Evolution of the coefficients of the VAR() representation of the 
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Figure 3  Replicating the Great Moderation: a typical stochastic simulation of 










































Figure 4  Medians and 90%-coverage percentiles of the distributions of the 
estimated impulse-response functions to a 100 basis points increase in the 
nominal rate, under determinacy and indeterminacy (based on 1,000 
replications) 37
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